Skip to main content

Lease the Turnpikes to Transform Oklahoma’s Road Infrastructure


Oklahoma can make a game-changing improvement in the quality of its roads, highways, and other transportation infrastructure, and in short order. Here’s how.

Back in January, I proposed monetizing large state-owned assets and using the proceeds to fund long-term budgetary needs, like underfunded pensions and transportation infrastructure. A prime candidate for monetization is the turnpike system, which I proposed leasing to private investors on a long-term basis and using the substantial windfall to improve other transportation infrastructure. Other states (most notably, Indiana) have pursued this strategy to great success, with the result being not just a financial boon to road funding but also improved management and quality of the privately operated toll roads. I conservatively estimated leasing the turnpikes would generate north of a billion dollars.


A new study indicates it would probably generate more like four times that. The Reason Foundation released a study last month proposing nine states’ toll road systems as great candidates for private leasing, including Oklahoma’s. The study illustrates just how lucrative such a transaction would be to the state. Using data from similar transactions in the US and abroad (where private leasing is more common), the study estimated the “gross valuation” of Oklahoma’s turnpikes at between $4.3 billion and $6.4 billion. 


After paying off all debt (the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority has inexplicably racked up extensive bonded indebtedness to continue building lightly-used toll roads to nowhere), the state would net an estimated $2.3 billion to $4.5 billion. Looking closely at the methodology, the low end estimates in this study were extremely conservative when compared to real-world transactions. The study points out that the few private toll road leases that have been put out to bid in the US in recent years have generated substantially more revenue than was estimated. So the actual figure for Oklahoma would likely be closer to the high end $4.5 billion estimate than the low end.


To put this in perspective, consider the following. Oklahoma’s “CIRB” (County Improvement for Roads and Bridges fund) has a 5-year plan that constitutes the state’s entire contribution to improving local roads and bridges, and the cost of every project on the 5-year plan totals less than $1 billion. The highest priority local road and bridge projects are on the CIRB plan, including 313 bridges and nearly 600 miles of roads. Leasing the turnpike system would fund CIRB four times over.


The Oklahoma Department of Transportation’s 8-year plan—the plan for all the critical highway and bridge projects ODOT intends to fund over the next 8 years—assumes a TOTAL expenditure of around $6 billion, including federal funds. A private lease of the turnpikes would fund nearly the entire 8-year plan, and would easily cover the state’s contribution. This is something the state could never otherwise hope to accomplish a single year, even with a massive tax increase or drastic shift in spending priorities. It would also annually free up state resources for other infrastructure projects or other spending priorities.


Leasing the turnpike system would generate massive funding for a core function of state government, improve the quality and operation of the turnpike itself for Oklahoma drivers, and offload state maintenance responsibilities. By my lights, that’s about as close to a win-win as we could hope for in state government.


Benjamin Lepak is Legal Fellow at the 1889 Institute. He can be reached at blepak@1889institute.org

Popular posts from this blog

Lies We Tell in Government, and Our Debts to Truth

HBO’s mini-series,  Chernobyl ,  is a drama depicting  the disastrous  1986  explosion ,  and  hero ic efforts to control the  resulting  meltdown ,  of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine  (then part of the Soviet Union ).  A flawed man, but true hero,  Valery  Alexeyvich   Legasov , worked tirelessly to ameliorate the disaster’s consequences and  chiefly  investigated its cause. He was  Deputy Director of the  Kurchatov  Institute of Atomic Energ y , a Soviet elite, who  is portrayed at the end of  the  series making a dramatic speech at a trial about how the nuclear reactor exploded, when  such an explosion in that type of reactor  should not have been possible. In the course of the series, the audience  learns  that the reactor had a design flaw that had been covered up by the Soviet State (true).  The audience also learns  that...

AG Hunter Lowers Boom on Barrier to Entry; Legislature Should Follow His Lead

Even as the Oklahoma Supreme Court  struck down  a recent alcohol distribution law, the Attorney General paved the way for the state’s Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement Commission (ABLE) to remove an obstacle from the expansion of liquor store competition - finding that Oklahoma’s five-year in-state residency requirement before one can own a liquor store likely runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution and recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  The AG’s  opinion , issued at the end of December, informs the state’s alcohol commission that portions of the state constitution (Article 28A, Section 4(A) & (B)) are unenforceable. These provisions require that ABLE issue a Retail Spirits License or Wine and Spirits Wholesaler License only to someone who has been a resident of Oklahoma for the previous five years. Presumably ABLE, who requested the opinion, will now begin issuing licenses to otherwise qualified applicants regardless of how long they have lived in Okl...

The Problem of Diffuse Costs and Concentrated Benefits

Do you ever find yourself observing a seemingly illogical government program , spending decision, or other strange practice and ask “how is it that no one has fixed that?” If you are like me, you encounter this phenomenon regularly. This often takes the form of a curious headline (Save Federal Funding for the Cowboy Poets!) that most people see and can’t believe is real. I would like to suggest that this phenomenon often results from the problem of diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. To understand this concept, consider a hypothetical law that assessed a $1 tax on everyone in the United States with the proceeds to be given to one individual for unrestricted use as he sees fit. The people harmed by such a law—the individual taxpayers—will not be very motivated to spend the time and effort to convince Congress to change the law. They might resent the dollar taken from them for a silly cause they don’t support, but the lost dollar isn’t worth the trouble of doing something about i...

When It Comes to the Cox Center, “What if I Get to Meet a Movie Star?” Isn’t Good Enough

In a recent   post , 1889 Institute expounded on the fiduciary duty of elected officials “to act in the best interest of the people of the state as a whole,” a “high duty, executed as a public trust … wherein one puts the people’s interest above one’s own.” This fiduciary duty must not stop with elected officials. Once an elected body or an elected official – the legislature, a city council, the governor, or a mayor – has taken final action, the faithful implementation of each enacted law, policy, or program falls to an army of bureaucrats. Thus, a fiduciary duty to execute laws and policies with diligence and integrity, tantamount to that of elected officials, must extend to government employees. Recently, I had a few moments to sit down and watch a show with my children. Unsurprisingly, my son picked a series entitled “The Stinky and Dirty Show.” I was naturally skeptical that the show would yield any real value. However, as I watched, I found myself pleasantly surprised. Each ep...